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 Political scandals are transnational events whose ramifications transcend the 
consequences that any single scandal may bring upon an individual nation-state or 
culture.  Scandals are costly to the global economy, with some of the more scandal prone 
countries such as the U.S. and Great Britain having spent hundreds of millions to 
investigate and resolve the issues raised by claims makers against one or more 
governmental agents. In this core of advanced capitalism that is wounded, limping along 
with stagnant growth and high unemployment and inflation, the costs of multiple 
scandals are one more item drawing capital away from “austere capitalism” and the 
corporate bottom line. For example, in the USA the cost of the Whitewater investigations 
by the Office of the Special Prosecutor was estimated at $64 million; this being only one 
scandal in a country that has been scandal plagued since the mid 1980s (De Soyza, 2002; 
Mancuso, 2002).  In semi-peripheral and peripheral nations the costs of scandal – often 
present as a society matures toward an industrial mode - may interfere with economic 
development or add to the burden of paying off foreign debt. Moreover, there is a social 
cost that cannot be estimated in dollars in that scandals may cause legitimacy problems 
for democratic or democratizing governments, making it more difficult for them to 
perform their functions adequately.  Citizens become cynical, placing little faith in 
government to do anything that would be of benefit to them.  This can lead to diminished 
interest among the best and brightest recruits to serve in government (Sabato, Stencel and 
Lichter, 2000; Solberg, 1990). 
 A global, 24 hour news cycle helps feed a self-perpetuating culture of mistrust 
and scandal in the media (Garment, 1991); television especially tends to convert coverage 
of law and politics into forms of entertainment for mass consumption.  Given the limited 
 2
time available for broadcast and the ever shortening attention span of a potentially 
shrinking audience, stories about political strategy, political infighting, political scandals 
and the private lives of politicians tend to crowd out less entertaining stories about 
substantive policy questions (Balkin, 1999).  In this environment, oversimplification rules 
the day; anything that cannot be chopped down to a brief sound bite is portrayed as being 
hopelessly complex (Mancuso, 2002).  Print and television journalists, furthermore, know 
that scandals can add to their employers’ bottom line, as a potential breaking scandal 
could be a prelude to other related scandals.  Then, with the tantalizing possibility that 
details of one or more scandals are being covered up, there are even more opportunities  
to report political troubles and to sell news stories (Lowi, 1988; Crouse, 1973).  
 Political scandals, despite their importance due to their cost and their relevance to 
a global, postmodern world, do not make a good subject for academic research.  They are 
extraordinarily difficult to study.  Definitional problems aside, they differ so much from 
one time period and one country or culture to the next that as fairly unique events they 
would seem to defy attempts at any form of generalization (Barker, 1994).  Then, citizens 
of a given society may change their minds about what kinds of behavior are scandalous; 
for example in the United States the issue of marital infidelity by presidential candidates 
appeared to undergo a sea change in a relatively short period of time, going from an issue 
of critical importance in the Gary Hart case to an issue of little importance in Bill 
Clinton’s case (Clark, 1992; Stoker, 1993). Further, some cultures outside the Americas 
place more emphasis upon the original transgression of an officeholder or candidate and 
less upon subsequent efforts to cover it up, as is the case in the United States (King, 
1986).  
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 This study is designed to make two contributions to the literature on international 
political scandals.  First, it adds to a growing pool of comparative international studies 
that have provided rich multicultural insight into the mechanisms by which scandals 
arise, are worked through, and resolved.  Second, as the study draws on sociological 
concepts, it is a step away from “scandalology,” a loosely defined area of 
interdisciplinary study based in political science which often suffers by presenting rich 
factual detail while neglecting broader analyses that look at structural issues that may be 
shaping the initiation and development of scandals.  Scandalology studies tend to be 
culture and time bound, reflecting the experience of scandals within a particular nation 
state or region at a particular point in history. 
Literature Review 
 Though important works in political sociology continue to neglect scandals as  
significant area of study (Nash and Scott, 2004; Robbins, 2005), enough work has been 
done on political scandals that we can no longer conclude, as Markovits and Silverstein 
(1988) did twenty years ago, that there is a dearth of research studies in the area.  There 
are now some impressive encyclopedic works about scandal that provide rich 
documentation of specific cases or “affairs” but are lacking in their investigation of the 
larger social contexts that may produce scandals in the first place (Wilson and Seaman, 
1986; Hyde, 1986; Callery, 1992; Palling, 1995; Parris, 1995; Grossman, 2003).  These 
studies analyze scandals in restricted times and spaces; and for the most part are void of 
comparative analyses.  These are less likely than other kinds of studies to shed any light 
upon scandals as global issues. An edited volume by Allen (1990) is a widely referenced 
example of this trend.  Allen provides information on 175 scandals or “causes celebres” 
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in 31 countries arranged alphabetically from Albania to Zimbabwe.   The coverage is 
competent and thorough, and though favoring core nations the book also provides 
coverage of scandals in semi peripheral countries such as Bulgaria and Hungary, and 
peripheral countries including Brazil, Myanmar, and India.  Allen selected cases that 1) 
involved political actors in some way (nonpolitical actors could be drawn in at certain 
points), and 2) were relatively self-contained episodes within a distinct time period.  
Allen’s work provides one launching point from which comparative studies of scandal 
may begin. 
 Similarly time and culture bound are other works that look at historically specific 
aspects of certain eras and time periods; for example, examining scandals of the 
Watergate period or of the Reagan and Clinton administrations with special attention to 
the scandal laden politics of the period (Cavender, Jurik and Cohen, 1993; Morris, 2003; 
Shah, Watts, Domke, and Fan, 2002; Lawrence and Bennett, 2001; and Kagay, 1999).  
Others focus on criminological aspects of these relatively recent historical cases (e.g., 
Friedrichs, 2000). 
Studies utilizing recent, trendy theories as an explanatory scheme are themselves 
products of a given place and time, for example, the use of postmodern theory to analyze 
and explain U.S. scandals from the 1980s onward (Lull and Hinerman, 1999; Larson and 
Wagner-Pacifici, 2001; and Chang, 2002). The evident purpose here is to use scandal as 
an instrument to deconstruct or criticize American society and its capitalistic culture.  The 
tone of the studies tends to be deconstructive but not reconstructive, and the works are 
mostly cultural critiques using the scandals as inviting openings for critical cultural 
studies of America.  
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An impressive work by Thompson (2000) attempts to discover why scandals 
occur, why we appear to have more scandals today than in the past, and what can be done 
to prevent them.  He begins by offering an operational definition of political scandal: it is 
a moral transgression, which must be named as misconduct by an interested party, and 
which then faces a level of opprobrium that risks damaging the reputation of the alleged 
transgressor.  This is the definition I embrace as I proceed with this paper. 
Thompson (2000) ties the origins of scandals to contemporary sociological theory 
and contributes a few theories of his own.  He discussed the functionalist theory of 
scandals,  which stated that political scandals can have important consequences but they 
only reaffirm the norms, conventions and institutions which constitute the social order.  A 
second theory, trivialization theory, discussed the impact that scandals have on the 
public’s view of politics.  This theory proposed that the media, by becoming preoccupied 
with a scandal, undermines the quality of public discourse and debate, which leads to an 
uniformed public.  Scandals thus trivialize politics. The third theory discussed by 
Thompson is the subversion theory which stated that scandals enrich the public by calling 
into question the dominant norms of journalism and by turning the tables on the powerful 
and the privileged.  Finally, Thompson discussed the no consequence theory, which 
stated that political scandals have no lasting significance on political or social life. This 
tying of scandals to sociological concepts advanced our thinking about scandals and also 
suggested lines of research that can help clarify support or non support for the ideas 
suggested (see also Peterson [2004]). 
 International studies of political scandals are beginning to attract the active 
interest of sociologists, political scientists, and other scholars.  Scandals have been the 
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object of study in Mexico, Central and South America, and several European countries 
(King, 1986; Wilson and Seaman, 1986; Hodder-Williams and Ceaser, 1986; Montero, 
Gunther and Torcal, 1998; Zirker and Redinger, 2003; Roussel, 2002; Waisbord, 1994; 
Levi, 1987; Jeffery and Green, 1995; Jimenez, 2004; Sherriff, O’Brien, Punch and 
Cannon, 1998; Herne, 1997; and Williams, 1970). These studies highlight the rich socio-
historical and socio-cultural contexts in which scandals take place, and remind us that a 
Eurocentric explanation for scandal may prove to be culturally limited. For example, 
Zirker and Redinger’s (2003) study of Brazilian scandals demonstrated how intelligence 
agencies played a primary role in the scandal making process during the post-dictatorial 
phase of that country’s development. Roussel (2002) studied the French “blood 
contamination scandal” which identified a strong disconnect between the narratives of the 
medical and political communities, and how difficult it is to manage crises given the 
complexities of democratic post-industrial societies today.  Waisbord (1994) discusses 
how the press played a key role in the rapid rise of scandals and accusations of 
government corruption in Argentina in the 1990s. An implication of these studies is that 
democratic or democratizing nations with a free press, intense political competition, 
decentralized political authority and multiple access points have numerous opportunities 
and incentives for scandal to flourish whereas more autocratic or totalitarian states do not 
(Lowi, 1988; Pujas, 1998).      
 Comparative study helps us to understand that despite their apparent uniqueness 
in time and space, scandals are not necessarily unique events, and they raise broader 
transnational structural questions about power and legitimacy.  For example, scandals can 
play a role in clarifying the normative bases of mass-elite interaction and political rule in 
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society.  They are a form of conflict, as they involve opposing social claims to the 
validity of norms, and the course of scandals is shaped by competing courses of actions in 
which instruments of power are used to try to defeat the opponent.  Finally, in the light of 
scandal more of everyday political reality is laid bare.  The societal reaction to scandal 
may well include much needed reforms in the political process (Neckel, 2005). 
 Comparative studies grounded in sociological theories would help advance 
systematic study of international scandals because sociology is interested in the political 
and sociological conditions that make scandals possible in the first place. The normative 
structure of society is important, particularly as it relates to the expectations and 
performance of politicians and state agents.  Those things that become scandals are often 
normative definitions thought to be breached in the political process.  In the USA in 
particular, a norm of reciprocity that is very strong develops which suggests that as the 
citizen has put his faith in the public servant, the latter will toil judiciously and 
benevolently for the public. The scandal damages the reputation of the person, the office 
and position, effectively disgracing each one.  In these cases the usual mystification of 
the delegates of political power is diminished, and the scandal experience makes officials 
appear untrustworthy and discredited.   
 Additionally, the sociological study of scandals is interested in why certain 
behaviors are defined as scandalous while others are not.  As Williams (1998) wrote, 
there is no obvious correspondence between the degree of controversy generated by 
scandals and the gravity of the alleged misdeeds.  Some of those involved in scandals pay 
a heavy price: resignation, disgrace, and even imprisonment.  Others, who seem equally 
culpable, somehow escape conviction and retire with dignity.  
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A Generalized Stage Model 
 The generalized stage model proposed here is designed to assess the conditions 
under which scandals arise, and to explain how certain behavior comes to be defined as 
scandal and by what processes other seemingly equally offensive behavior escapes being 
labeled as scandal.  A strength of the model is its multicultural emphasis, drawing insight 
from studies of political scandal in Italy, Spain, France, Japan, Russia, and the USA.   
The model also draws upon several bodies of sociological theory including functionalism, 
conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, and postmodernism.  No claim is made that the 
model is all inclusive or is all capable of explaining every instance of political scandal 
internationally, nor are the stages themselves necessary and sufficient conditions for 
scandals to develop and be played out.  There may be individual cases that do not 
conform to the stages presented, or that skip some of the stages, or that violate and nullify 
some of the concepts proposed. 
Stage 1: Structural Conduciveness. A particular national social structure must be 
conducive or open to the possibility of scandal before it can occur (Smelser, 1963). 
Western societies are generally more open democratic structures in which the possibility 
of scandal or wrongdoing is real given the imperfect nature of humans and institutions.  
Even contentious claims are allowable under tenets of free speech and may have at least 
some minimal cause for thoughtful deliberation or investigation by public authorities. 
Such open societies are thus vulnerable to a degree of scandal susceptibility (Lull and 
Hinerman, 1997; Barker, 1994).  Closed, totalitarian societies may allow scandals to 
exist, but only for specific reasons so as to make a political point.  Insider accounts of 
closed societies paint a picture of total corruption where wrongdoing has become the 
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norm, at least from the standpoint and definitions of the Western world (Caiden and 
Caiden, 1977; Solzhenitsyn, 1962). 
Stage 2: Claims and Defenses. In this stage, the initial claims against political 
officials or candidates for office are made and the accused authorities are given a chance 
to deny or rebut the claims made against them.  If the official makes a strong denial and 
there are no more follow-up claims or no additional claims made, then the matter dies and 
does not become a public issue.  Vice President George H.W. Bush’s strong denial that 
he had an affair with his appointments secretary, Jennifer Fitzgerald, essentially averted a 
scandal as no more claims were made and no more evidence surfaced of adultery 
involving the former Vice President and Fitzgerald (Kurtz, 1992; Allen and Bahrampour, 
1992).  This stands in contrast to the case of former presidential candidate Gary Hart, 
whose denials of an affair were followed up quickly with photos that clearly disproved 
his claims of innocence (Stoker, 1993).  
Most issues that have the possibility of being framed as scandals are much more 
complicated that those of George Bush and Gary Hart in that evidence to support or not 
support the official or the official version of events may take time to work its way into 
the public domain, and the mass media holds much power in this regards as editorial 
decisions are made about which issues are deemed newsworthy and which are not.  The 
media has power to frame the issues and their importance, and the public often follows 
the media’s lead, at least initially. In the controversy surrounding the assassination of 
U.S. President Kennedy in 1963, the media strongly supported the report of the Warren 
Commission and public support of the Commission’s report was strong for about a year 
before a series of books critical of the report began to surface (see Weeber, 2003).  In the 
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2003 Iraq War, there were similar circumstances in that the press coverage of the war 
which was largely supportive of the war effort appeared to follow a scripted line crafted 
by the Department of Defense. Some alleged that the purpose of the coverage was more 
to entertain than to inform.  There were suspicions that the coverage was distributed to 
key supportive opinion makers first, and then to the public (Dadge and Schecter, 2004). 
Beginning in 2004, allegations surfaced of misconduct by U.S. troops which reflected the 
opening wave of disillusionment with the war, and these topics were initially (as the War 
began) considered off limits and not newsworthy (Hersh, 2004).  In complex situations 
like these where allegations of wrongdoing may persist over time, it’s possible that there 
could be no real resolution to the scandalous events, despite efforts by writers to “close” 
the matter (Posner, 1993; Bugliosi, 2007).  
As these two cases demonstrate, as time passes, more circumstances that were not 
viewed previously as scandalous find their way into the public consciousness.  Something 
similar happens in developing countries as they grow to approximate an industrial mode.  
What is considered corrupt or scandalous changes as the nation’s circumstances change. 
Gift-giving, a culturally prescribed means of establishing good relationships among elites 
and lower classes in pre-industrial societies becomes something that is perceived much 
differently after industrialization and the establishment of an administrative state 
(Bourdieu, 1977; Robbins, 2005).  As Smelser (1971) wrote:  
Viewed from a social-psychological standpoint, institutionalizing a state 
   apparatus simultaneously calls for a new kind of interpersonal trust in  
   the system.  A civil servant is trusted by the citizenry because of his  
   presumed commitment to an occupational role that is implicated in the  
   political-legal system.  This depersonalization of the trust relationship  
   is often unfamiliar to and unwelcomed by those whose trust is usually  
   based on more immediate or particularistic relationship with others.   
   The act of corruption can be regarded as an accommodation to the  
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   ambiguities that arise in the new, generalized relations between  
   bureaucrat and clientele.  Because the corrupt interchange is immediate  
   and situational – a gift for a decision, a bribe for an act, a tip for an  
   evasion, and so on – it brings the bureaucrat and client into a less  
   contingent and less ambiguous relationship to one another.  Corruption 
   is a device that serves to concretize and reinfuse trust into the relationship  
   between an impersonal authority system and its clients who may not  
   understand or grant loyalty to that system. 
 
Smelser would no doubt concur that the imposition or sudden adoption of liberal 
democracy may cause tensions in the society that encourage corruption, which in turn 
works to undermine the tenets of the new liberal democratic system.  Solberg (1990) 
elaborates: 
  A culture where government and business relationships have been  
  traditionally based upon personal trust will resist the distinction between  
  the public duty and private interests of politicians.  This has two results,  
  one, corruption is likely to be widespread.  Two, with this corruption  
  resting so firmly upon a traditional cultural base, and the tenets of liberal  
  democracy so new and so foreign, this corruption is not nearly as likely to  
  be condemned.   
 
What Smelser and Solberg describe here is a social process where there may be 
legitimate cultural reasons for engaging in behavior defined as corruption along with 
some lingering cultural support for “corruption” despite its obvious opprobrium in the 
more advanced democracies.  Thus, when democratizing countries appear to be steeped 
in scandal, this does not mean that the countries suddenly became corrupt, but rather that 
historically accepted routines had finally become defined as unacceptable and illicit by 
law enforcement and judiciaries.  The fairly recent scandals in Italy (“Bribe City”), 
France (blood contamination) and Spain (campaign finance) serve as examples of this 
process at work (Kuhn and Neveu, 2003; Pujas, 1998; Roussel, 2002).   
Governmental agents, in making their defenses, may, like those in the corruption 
cases above, deny that anything wrong has transpired, and may actually forget the 
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original incident that becomes their downfall.  In doing so, they inadvertently begin a 
cover up of the original transgression which could take on a larger life than the original 
event.  A strong degree of insularity and the tendency toward groupthink pervades the 
staffs of American presidents and make them particularly vulnerable to scandalous 
situations (Biggart, 1985).  In memoirs of the Watergate scandal, Presidential aide H.R. 
Haldeman (1994) and President Nixon (1978) indicate that the original decision to deploy 
the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s investigation into the hush money paid to the Watergate 
burglars was never questioned by anyone on the President’s staff; it was quickly decided 
upon as the right course of action on a very busy day of decision making in June, 1972.  
And had James McCord not written his letter to the judge at his trial, there is a possibility 
that the Watergate affair would have ended with the jailing of the Watergate burglars 
(Bernstein and Woodward, 1974).  Without follow up claims, it is possible that many 
scandalous situations die in stage 2. Scandals can abruptly end if there’s no real news to 
report or no collective sense that a scandal has occurred, despite the best efforts of claims 
makers (Mancuso, 2002). 
Stage 3: Conflict. Assuming that the original claims facilitate a continuing 
disagreement between officeholders and claims makers, or that follow-up claims ignite 
even more contention, then the scandalous situation enters a period of conflict.  The 
conflict is not simply a matter of ”us versus them” but also a battle for the opinion of 
newspaper editors, court officials, and the public, who may have the final say in the 
matter of what comes to be defined as scandalous and what does not (Lang and Lang, 
1983; Robinson, 1974).  Scandals are open processes of which the final result is uncertain 
and depends on the interplay of some intermediate variables (Jimenez, 1998).  
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Consequently, I identify a number of such variables or factors that tend to accelerate or 
delimit scandal-oriented conflicts; the former obviously pushing scandals toward the next 
level while the delimiters function to keep the controversy under wraps, where it may 
simply die out, fading into history and into obscurity. 
Scandal Escalators.  First, conflicts escalate into major disputes when the 
President or top political officers of the country played or were suspected of playing a 
role in some corrupt or objectionable actions. The ante is upped when special prosecutors 
or independent counsels are appointed (Garrard and Newell, 2006; Peterson, 2004).   
Second, whether scandals are able to emerge in the first place and what topics they 
involve depend on the active participation of the public sphere in political events. Thus, 
conflict intensifies when there is a growing sense of injustice among the public at large. 
For example, concern over corruption in Spain in the spring of 1994 led to the 
resignations of five key officials of the Socialist Party (Jimenez, 1998).  Third, conflict 
may become more incendiary if the public sphere is polarized, as was the case in Spain in 
the 1980s and 1990s where voter loyalty was split between the Socialists and the Populist 
Party.  Fourth, if scandals resonate with diverse elements of newsworthiness, high 
principles, and personal drama, then the public may be drawn in to the scandal as a 
human interest story. 
Fifth, conflict may escalate if a central forum facilitates disclosure of information, 
such as a Supreme Court; and, if there is a strong opponent to pursue scandal. Sixth, if the 
defending side is split - often a consequence of an increasing lack of public trust – then 
the efforts of claims makers may be more effective.  Seventh, if collective framing or 
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public opinion suggests that popular support for the officeholder or candidate is eroding, 
then the efforts of the claims makers gain momentum. 
Eighth, when the norm of reciprocity is being violated, there may be an escalation 
in calls for resignation, even among the officeholder’s respected allies.  For example, 
when the rigors of the Watergate scandals was believed to be interfering with President 
Nixon’s ability to lead his party and country in the summer of 1974, more and more of 
his Republican colleagues called for his resignation.  The gravity of the situation had to 
be “translated” to Nixon by respected conservative Barry Goldwater.   
 Is there a critical tipping point at which a situation of conflict will boil over into a 
full scandal?  It appears, certainly, that the more of the escalating factors that are present, 
the more likely the situation is to become a scandal. Beyond this, however, a crucial 
juncture may lie in the perception of the offensive behavior as being either a mistake or 
an error.  This first is forgivable while the latter is not.  The first warrants a second try or 
a “do over” that essentially covers the first transgression.  An error does not, and being 
unforgivable, remains as a blemish upon the life of the officeholder.  One exact tipping 
point could be when the norm of reciprocity has been violated, as was the case with 
President Nixon and his work as President of the USA when it was suspected that 
Watergate was taking up an extraordinary part of his administrative time.  Lesser norm 
violations which are forgivable may not progress to full blown scandals. For example, 
despite the press’ efforts to create a scandal when Clinton Administration official Sandy 
Berger stole sensitive national security documents from the U.S. Federal Archives, no 
scandal was forthcoming.  Berger’s mistake, apparently, was forgivable. 
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Scandal Delimiters. There are many delimiting factors that prevent certain events 
that have the potential of scandal from cascading into full scandal.  In Spain in the 1980s, 
popular support for the Socialists together with weak opposition and favorable media 
coverage meant that claims makers could make little headway in scandal creation, at least 
before the Juan Guerra case surfaced in 1990.  Second, if the event or person being 
targeted remains an isolated event unconnected to a larger system of ill conduct or 
wrongdoing, there is less likelihood of a scandal developing.  Such was the case with the 
Recruit scandal in Japan and with the Puerta and Rumasa cases in Spain which were 
1980s pre-Guerra cases (Jimenez, 1998; Solberg, 1990).  Third, there may be so many 
scandals in such a short time that the public turns away from them, turned off and 
fatigued by all the controversies (Mancuso, 2002).  It may be that moral expectations 
toward political power no longer exist after repeated scandals, and the public is cynical.  
It could also be true, additionally, that competing news events for a while drown out 
stories of scandal, as was the case after the September 11th terrorist attacks (Weeber and 
Turner, 2007).  
Fourth, if national consensus is unquestioned, as was the case in the USA 
following September 11th, then normally newsworthy events often go unnoticed in the 
wake of collective goodwill and patriotism.  U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s unusual 
accounting methods as CEO of Halliburton were a potential scandal in the making, but 
were basically drowned out in the fall of 2001 by War on Terrorism news.  Such an 
exception from scandal making does not have a long shelf life, however, as Trent Lott 
found out: his favorable comments about the racist Strom Thurmond cost him his job as 
Senate Majority Leader in 2002 (Weeber and Turner, 2007). 
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Fifth, if the claims makers by accusations “punish” the errant public servant to 
excess, a public backlash in support of that servant may stymie the efforts of claims 
makers to have their officially validated by the judicial process.  This may have occurred 
in the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal as the public believed the Special Prosecutor had lost his 
sense of reasonable proportion in his effort to convict Bill Clinton at all costs.  As 
Mancuso (2002) wrote, Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr abandoned all considerations of 
measured and moderated judgment.  He was stigmatized as someone obsessed with his 
subject and willing to conduct any manner of experiment that might lead him to more 
evidence. Hence, though the press and prosecutors may stridently pursue a scandal, the 
public may purposely not buy into it (Neckel, 2005; Toobin, 1999; Sabato, Stencel and 
Lichter, 2000; Morris, 2003; Shaw, Watts, Domke, and Fan, 2002). 
 Sixth, the powerful may on occasion successfully delimit the issues that can be 
defined as scandal.  This occurred in the Cheney-Halliburton case, as George W. Bush-
appointed SEC commissioners neglected to pursue the strongest penalties against both 
the company and Cheney.  Seventh, any potential scandal runs into the problem of not 
having enough time to sufficiently draw up charges against the accused officeholder or 
candidate.  Much like a bill that can “stall” in a legislature and not be brought to vote, 
charges against an official may run into time deadlines that cannot be met (Mancuso, 
2002). 
Eighth and finally, scandals involving officials below that of top ranking officials 
are less likely to result in charges being brought and special investigations or special 
prosecutors being mobilized for action.  It is difficult to stimulate public interest in such 
cases. 
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Again, the question of a critical tipping point emerges with respect to the factors 
delimiting a scandal.  An absence of accelerants together with the existence of a larger 
number of delimiting factors would be predictive of no scandal developing.  Once again, 
the norm of reciprocity may be of special importance.  If this norm is unbroken and the 
problem of the officeholder or candidate can be effectively framed in that person’s 
private sphere as unrelated to his public work, then a catastrophic scandal has been 
avoided.  Probably the classic case of damage control that deflected a scandal was the 60 
Minutes interview where then candidate Bill Clinton along with his wife Hillary were 
able to skillfully frame governing as public sphere behavior and Bill Clinton’s 
womanizing as personal, private sphere behavior with an emphasis on how the two are 
completely separate (Toobin, 1999).  Rozell and Wilcox (2000) argued that as long as the 
President (or by extension any leader) operates successfully in his or her job, it is easier 
for the public to separate the public and private spheres, and to forgive the official’s 
private transgressions.    
The information regarding the acceleration and delimiting of conflict can be 
summarized as follows.  The pushes toward scandal are equivalent in number to the pulls 
away from it; yet, the former would appear to carry more weight than the latter in 
determining whether or not a scandal will emerge from a situation of prolonged conflict 
between claims makers and public officials.  The worldwide proliferation of scandals in 
itself would appear to validate this statement.  
Stage 4: Acknowledgment.  To claims makers, an important validation of their 
efforts occurs when political officials do not survive their scandals, having to leave office 
or face sanctions up to imprisonment for their scandalous behavior. Claims makers have 
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much success, judging from world newspaper headlines and U.S. congressional 
publications that keep track of errant American Congressmen. The exact moment of 
acknowledgment is unknown, although journalists speak of scandals as “having legs,” or 
staying power.  Here, the story is one that will endure for a while, and consequences for 
the official may be forthcoming.  Ironically though, there are also many cases that, while 
clearly scandalous in the public’s collective mind, never get an official stamp of 
wrongdoing or guilt.  The Clinton-Lewinsky scandal that left Clinton in office is one 
example; President Ford’s full pardon issued to Richard Nixon is another. In these cases 
there is a diffused public acknowledgement of scandal but not an official one. 
  Stage 5: Resolution.  This stage concerns what happens in the aftermath of the 
scandal, regardless of whether it has or has not been officially acknowledged.  The 
consequences can be quite severe, as in the case of the Bribe City scandal in Italy which 
resulted in the break-up of Italy’s main government parties, the transformation of the 
entire party system and the onset of a process of regime transition (Garrard and Newell, 
2006).  
 A functionalist approach to scandal emphasizes positive effects of the 
phenomenon including how it reinforces the community’s collective consciousness.  
Scandals, at least temporarily, may lead to a higher standard of ethics along with new 
rules or laws designed to prevent future scandals (Jimenez, 1998; Mackenzie and Hafkin, 
2002).  Resolution of the conflict may restore faith in governmental processes, and the 
scandal may provide a new direction, a point of departure from the scandalous course that 
the government had been following in the past (Barker, 1994) 
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 In contrast Solberg (1990), reflecting upon his study of Japan’s Recruit scandal, 
fears the cascading effects that scandals can have.  He sees an unending cycle of Japanese 
scandal followed by reform (which defines more behavior as scandal) followed by 
scandal, followed by reform.  With each cycle scandalous behavior is easier to find 
because there is more of it being officially recognized.  He fears that Japan could become 
paralyzed by scandal.  Mancuso (2002) voices similar concerns for America, especially 
the media’s hunger for scandal and its efforts to manufacture scandal where none exists. 
 Potentially most frustrating of all is the situation where scandals exist in 
perpetuity with no sign of resolution or closure at all.  The controversies over the 
assassination of President Kennedy and over the necessity of the 2003 Iraq War are two 
examples previously mentioned.  It is possible that questions about who did what to 
whom and for what purpose could be debated by historians and publics for millennia to 
come. 
Conclusion 
 This comparative study of political scandals in Italy, France, Spain, Japan, Russia 
and the United States led to the development of a sociology-based generalized stage 
model that is an initial step in explaining why scandals arise and how they are worked 
through and resolved.  A crucial phase is the conflict phase between elites and masses, 
where potential scandals may die while others accelerate.  The question of which events 
evolve to scandal and which do not is also likely to be worked through in this phase.  The 
norm of reciprocity between officials and the public played a significant role in both 
scandal acceleration and scandal delimitation.  As accelerant, a broken norm of 
reciprocity leaves the official paralyzed by the scandal and incapable for performing his 
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or her duties effectively.  As delimiter, an unbroken norm of reciprocity can salvage the 
official’s job when that person’s scandalous behavior can be framed within and 
successfully limited to his or her private sphere, leaving the public sphere unaffected.   
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